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Changing organizational reputation in management consulting 
ABSTRACT 
Despite a growth of work on building, managing and rehabilitating organizational reputation, 
we know relatively little about how organizations can effectively change their reputations.  
Through studying the case of a global management consulting firm, we show how firms with 
positive reputations can change their reputations despite resistance from different 
stakeholders.  We find that particular organizational factors comprising of legitimated 
expertise, relevant celebrity and strong relationships as well as institutional conditions such 
as the knowledge of clients, competition environment and firm history can enable 
organizations to change their reputations.  A significant contribution of this paper is to show 
how firms with established reputations can overcome the burden of reputation stickiness 
through satisfying certain organizational factors and institutional conditions. 
Keywords: 
Reputation, change, stickiness, organizational factors; institutional conditions, management 
consulting, qualitative research  
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a growing research agenda on organizational reputation and particularly on building 
reputation (Rindova et al., 2005; Lange et al., 2011; Wæraas and Sataøen, 2015; Love et al., 
forthcoming), there has been little work on how organizations seek to strategically change 
their reputation, as opposed to changing their reputation in response to a crisis (Zavyalova et 
al., 2016; Bundy et al., forthcoming).  While there is a body of research exploring how 
organizations are impacted by and respond to reputational crises (Rhee and Haunschild, 
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2006; Rhee and Valdez, 2009), there has been little research on organizations who are 
proactively seeking to change their reputations as opposed to reactively responding to a crisis.  
This is an important oversight given the rapidly changing business landscape and the constant 
demand for established organizations to offer new products and services to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors.  For example, having previously dominated the mobile 
phone industry with 50% of the smartphone market share at the end of 2007 and having held 
a reputation as a highly innovative firm (Vuori and Huy, 2016), Nokia’s failed attempts to 
change its reputation following the introduction of next-generation smartphones, and 
particularly Apple Inc.’s iPhone in 2007, is just one of countless illustrations of how 
organizations can fail to change their reputations.  
The purpose of this paper is to enhance existing reputation theory to understand how 
organizations change their reputations.  To do this, we undertook exploratory research in a 
large global management consulting firm examining how it attempted to change its 
reputation.  We were particularly interested in this sector given the difficulty for clients of 
judging reputation ex ante and ex post (Greenwood et al., 2005).  Our theoretical contribution 
is to provide an explanatory framework that shows how reputation is changed through 
organizational factors, namely, legitimated expertise, relevant celebrity and strong 
relationships, and suggest that these create what we term reputational plausibility.  We also 
highlight the salience of institutional conditions for enabling organizations to change their 
reputations and overcome reputational stickiness. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Defining, building and repairing reputation 
The concept of reputation focuses on the evaluation and distinctiveness of a focal 
organization from others in its peer group (Bitektine, 2011).  Reputation refers to the multiple 
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social judgments that internal and external actors make about the actions of the focal 
organization, and which influence the way that these actors view claims that an organization 
may project about itself (Chun, 2005; Harvey et al., forthcoming).  Ertug and Castellucci 
(2013) argue that reputation signals the expected future behavior, performance, or quality of 
actors based on their previously observed behavior, performance, or quality in both economic 
and sociological accounts.  While seen as an asset of the organization, reputation is therefore 
essentially a socio-cognitive concept based on peer group perceptions (Rindova et al., 2010).  
Several studies have investigated the process of reputation building (Deephouse and Carter, 
2005; Rindova et al., 2005; Rindova et al., 2007; Petkova, 2012).  This body of work has 
shown that different reputational assets accumulate through somewhat separate processes but 
have overlapping antecedents (Lange et al., 2011).  Organizations which succeed in being 
known for something often bolster their favorability, particularly when the something is 
deemed important by stakeholders such as financial performance (Lange et al., 2011).  
Pfarrer et al. (2010) found that firms with high rankings by third parties tended to receive 
smaller stock market penalties when they reported negative earnings surprises than firms with 
low rankings.  Similarly, Rindova et al. (2005) found that positive evaluations of quality 
increase prominence and note the need for more work in impression formation to understand 
how quality and prominence are shaped.  One possibility is that reputation building occurs 
through a cascade effect, wherein a core group of stakeholders are attracted by the valued 
outputs of firms, leading to other stakeholders becoming aware of the firm because of its 
increasing attention (Lange et al. (2011: 168-169).  Rhee and Haunschild (2006) argue that 
prominence is not necessarily always positive as they find that established automobile 
companies who gain a reputation for high quality experience greater market share losses 
when they run into difficulties.  Wade et al. (2006) find that well-known organizations can 
experience the ‘burden of celebrity’ when they face intense scrutiny and Brooks et al. (2003) 
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suggest that building familiarity can breed ambivalence when stakeholders hold positive and 
negative evaluations of the firm simultaneously.  Näslund (2012) found that more visible 
management consulting firms increase awareness among a broader set of stakeholders, which 
helps to achieve public reputation and over time this is reinforced through informal networks 
between consultants and clients, which is what Glückler and Armbrüster refer to as 
‘networked reputation’.  
The reputation literature has also explored how organizations manage reputation threats.  
When organizations face external threats, this can cause a reevaluation of an organization’s 
identity among its members (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991) and new attempts to impact 
external perceptions, particularly when there is a significant reputation and identity 
dissonance (Harvey et al., 2017).  In some cases, this leads to reevaluations among members 
about ‘what their organization is really about’, as Ravasi and Schultz (2006: 455) found in 
the context of Bang & Olufsen.  Organizational leaders actively seek to impact internal and 
external perceptions of organizations in the face of reputation and identity threats (Corley and 
Gioia, 2004).  Elsbach and Kramer (1996) show how leaders of business schools deployed 
cognitive tactics such as focusing on particular dimensions and comparing themselves to 
other high ranked organizations in response to negative ranking results in Businessweek to 
maintain perceptions among internal and external stakeholders.  The responses to such 
reputation threats depend on whether they challenge the core identity of the organization 
(Dutton et al., 1994; Gioia et al., 2000).  Gioia et al. (2013) raise the important conceptual 
and empirical concern for the organizational identity literature of whether identity is stable 
(enduring identity) or changeable (dynamic identity) over time.  In contrast to the 
organizational identity literature which has focused more on identity change and less on 
identity formation (Gioia et al., 2013), the reputation literature has focused more on 
reputation formation and less on reputation change.    




The reputation literature which has focused on change has tended to emphasize 
organizational responses to reputational crises (Rhee and Valdez, 2009), for example through 
impression management approaches such as PR, advertising, re-branding and leadership 
changes (Carter and Dukerich, 1998; Rindova and Fombrun, 1999).  Rhee and Kim (2012) 
have referred to this as ‘superficial’ responses in contrast to ‘substantive’ responses which 
involve large-scale reorganizations to centralize control or asset sales.  We agree with these 
authors that further research is needed to explore how organizations change in response to 
less prominent but more frequently occurring ‘issues’.  
Reputation change is important because it is what Greenwood et al. (2005: 664) refer to as 
‘sticky’, meaning it is difficult ‘transferring reputation from one product or service to 
another’.  The authors argue that reputation stickiness is particularly apparent in professional 
service firms (PSFs) because the actions and recommendations of these providers can have 
major implications on the financial performance and even the survival of their client 
organizations.  Hence, clients do not accept changes in reputation claims by PSFs uncritically.  
They also argue that professionals can have concerns about the potential damage of their 
employer’s as well as their own individual reputations from attempting to change their 
reputation.  Greenwood et al. (2005: 670) argue: ‘As PSFs diversify they must do so in a 
significant rather than incremental manner because of the risks of image contamination and 
reputation stickiness’.  Reputation is a sticky intangible asset that is hard to change, but can 
be built through consistent improvement in financial performance, according to Ang and 
Wight (2009).  They argue that because stakeholders closely monitor performance, consistent 
improvement in performance can be an important strategy for changing reputation, even for 
firms who have historically performed poorly.  Despite the difficulty of changing reputation, 
Anand et al. (2007) argue that PSFs are under pressure from their clients to innovate and to 
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show that their partners are thought leaders in a field, which arguably incentivizes partners to 
create new practice areas rather than necessarily consolidate existing areas of expertise.  
Hence, there is an important tension between the difficulty of changing reputation and the 
expectation of change within PSFs.   
In summary, despite an established literature on how organizations build reputation and 
respond to threats and crises, there has been less theoretical development around how they 
change their reputations, particularly in the empirical context of PSFs when it is seemingly 
encouraged but is difficult to achieve.  We present a case study of how a global management 
consulting firm has sought to change its reputation with varying degrees of success.  This 
leads us to ask the following research question: 
How can organizations effectively change their reputation? 
METHODS 
Rationale and Context 
We employed a single, embedded case study design (Yin, 2009) in which we studied a large 
global management consulting firm, Bespoke Solutions1, in order to understand how the firm 
sought to change its reputation.  The firm is wholly owned by its partners who are divided 
into geographic and market sector based units for the purpose of client work.  We studied its 
core geographic practice, located in Germany and by focusing on the heartland of the firm we 
sought to sample an exemplary case in which we could build an understanding of the historic 
development of the firm and its reputation while controlling for the institutional and market 
environments in which it operates (Kipping and Kirkpatrick, 2013; McKenna, 2006).  
                                                 
1 We use the pseudonym Bespoke Solutions for the subject organization in order to maintain confidentiality 
which was a condition of research access. 
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Bespoke Solutions has operated through a network of offices in this region for nearly fifty 
years.   
Management consulting is an example of a professional service in which reputation plays a 
central role in client and labour markets (Boussebaa et al., 2012; Greenwood et al., 2005; 
Kipping and Clark, 2012; Sturdy and Wright, 2011; Bidwell et al., 2014; Harvey et al., 2017).  
These firms compete on the basis of intangible, customized and complex services for clients 
by deploying expert knowledge embodied in individuals and in knowledge systems to solve 
client problems (Morris and Empson, 1998; Werr and Stjernberg, 2003).  Reputation is 
therefore very important for management consulting and other PSFs because it is a signal of 
quality which can be strengthened, or damaged with serious consequences for firm survival 
and success (Armbrüster, 2006; Coffee, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2005; Von Nordenflycht, 
2010).  Strong reputations permit firms to charge premium prices (Sherer and Lee 2002; 
Maister, 1992) and hire high quality professionals (Starbuck, 1992; Hitt et al., 2006).  Some 
evidence suggests that PSFs seek to either consolidate their existing reputation and/or transfer 
their reputation into new services or into different geographies (Greenwood et al., 2005; 
Anand et al., 2007).  
Data Collection 
As our aim was to understand how the firm and its canonical practice (Anand et al., 2007) 
had tried to change its corporate reputation, we wanted to develop a strong sense of the firm’s 
history and expansion since its inception in the 1960s.  We focused on interviewing external 
stakeholders to understand external perceptions of the organization and internal stakeholders 
to understand what and how the firm was trying to change its reputation.  We used a range of 
data sources, including archival data from within the firm and media reports, as well as semi-
structured interviews, focus groups, and informal observations.  Some of the written material 
was in German and some in English.  We used archival data to build an understanding of the 
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historical development of reputation and the context in which the firm operated.  Semi-
structured interviews and focus groups provided the data on the intentions of partners and 
others as they deployed or tried to change reputation in everyday client work.  As Helm 
(2013) notes, reputational assessments among stakeholders are often aligned but internal and 
external actors’ perceptions may vary (Brown et al., 2006) and we therefore sought data from 
clients and competitors as well as consultants. 
Data collection started with a review of internal documents, confidential client, competitor 
and employee surveys relating to Bespoke Solutions’ reputation as well as external 
documents such as media reports and articles on the firm and the industry more widely.  We 
then interviewed 36 consultants from Bespoke Solutions, 14 clients who were working in 
senior management positions of other organizations, 11 consultants who were working in 
competitor organizations and 11 students of elite business schools from whom the firm and 
its competitors hired a large volume of its consultants.  The Bespoke Solutions and 
competitor consultant interviewees were drawn from different hierarchical levels in the firm, 
from managing partner to consultant, to obtain a broad range of perceptions of the reputation 
change activities of Bespoke Solutions.  Interviews were typically conducted face-to-face in a 
conference room, however several interviews were conducted over the telephone when 
interviewees were working away from their office.  The interviews were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim.  Initially the interviews were relatively exploratory covering the 
development of the firm, how consultants worked with each other and with clients, the 
services they delivered and how they perceived the reputation of the firm as well as how they 
made judgments of reputation.  Subsequently, interviews became more focused and 
standardized as we sought to understand the reputational activities of consultants and how 
these were enacted during client assignments, which formed the core of their work in the 
national practices. 
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At the end of the interview process, two focus groups were conducted with different 
stakeholders such as employees, clients and students.  The purpose of these focus groups was 
to probe key topics that had been highlighted during the course of the fieldwork.  The 
interviews and focus groups took place between May and November of 2010.  Finally, three 
one-day meetings were organized with 24 partners in 2011, 2012 and 2013 from different 
practice areas enabling us to explore further how the firm managed its reputation as well as to 
probe and check our emerging understanding of the findings.  Clients were present for part of 
these meetings and engaged in discussion about the reputation of the focal firm and its 
competitors; how their perceptions of reputation were formed and changed; and how 
reputation affected relations and buying decisions.  We were confident we had reached 
saturation in data collection after this. 
The researchers spent several days in different office locations where interviews had been 
arranged.  This provided the opportunity for informal non-participant observation and for 
discussion with individuals and teams when they were in the office as well as during 
evenings when consultants were available to have informal discussions about the firm and its 
reputational challenges.  A fieldwork diary was used to capture some of these informal 
observations and discussions.  Project updates with key gatekeepers provided regular 
opportunities for two-way feedback. 
To ensure trustworthiness in our data we undertook several actions.  We sought and obtained 
prolonged engagement with our subject organization and its practices.  We generated data 
from several sources, including clients and competitors who were informed observers and 
had extensive interaction with the focal firm.  These informants offered an external reliability 
check on the claims of the consultants and we used them to understand to what extent the 
firm’s reputation had changed.  We discussed our findings in a long formal session with the 
senior officers of Bespoke Solutions who had facilitated our access across the firm.  We also 
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summarized our findings in a report and presentation to senior members of the firm and we 
conducted several informal meetings with small groups of partners and alumni which gave us 
good confidence in our results (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Data Analysis 
The data were largely analyzed after the completion of the fieldwork, although the research 
team engaged in frequent discussions during the interview period about the findings and 
began to build an initial coding scheme as themes became apparent.  The archival data was 
translated into English and the interviews and focus groups were transcribed and summaries 
for all non-recorded interviews were created.  NVivo8 and 9 were used for data management, 
coding and analysis.  For each interview, a case profile was created containing demographic 
information about the interviewee.  The responses from internal respondents were stratified 
into senior (e.g. Partners and Principals), middle (e.g. Senior Consultants and Project 
Managers) and junior (e.g. Consultants and Internees) employees.  From archival and 
interview data we identified first-order, second-order and third-order themes for this paper 
(see Table 1).  This process involved a combination of inductive and deductive coding.  We 
engaged in frequent discussions about the emerging codes as the process of data analysis took 
place. 
Our data show from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, Bespoke Solutions attempted to build 
its reputation as a management consulting firm with strong restructuring capabilities, which 
was legitimated by large-scale change projects.  From the early 2000s to 2013, Bespoke 
Solutions deliberately adopted a different strategy where it attempted to change its reputation 
into a strategy consulting firm and during this stage there was an emphasis on strategy 
projects and entrepreneurialism.  Our coding explored in greater detail the particular 
characteristics during the firm’s early stages, including successful interactions, substantive 
expertise and high profile work with prestigious clients.  Since the early 2000s, our coding 
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indicated the importance of endorsements and building new relationships, but there was 
significant scepticism and challenges from different stakeholders around these claims.  This 
led to an additional level of coding with certain organizational factors such as legitimated 
expertise, relevant celebrity and strong relationships as well as institutional conditions such 
as the knowledge of clients, competition environment and firm history acting as important 
explanatory factors for the success of building a restructuring reputation from the late 1980s 
to the early 2000s, but the partial failure of changing its reputation since the early 2000s to 
the end of our fieldwork in 2013. 
 
-------------- 




Bespoke Solutions was established in the late 1960s and worked for manufacturing 
companies, gradually establishing a reputation locally for strong operational and restructuring 
capabilities, particularly during the period from the late 1980s to the early 2000s.  While 
some of the well-known strategy and general consulting firms had offices in Germany, the 
field of management consulting was not as mature, nor as dominated by well-established 
actors, as in the Anglo-American context (Kipping and Engwall, 2002; Sahlin-Andersson and 
Engwall, 2002; Armbrüster, 2006).  Many of Bespoke Solutions’ clients were ‘mittelstand’ 
who offered short-term, problem solving engagements with a relatively small value compared 
to the longer, large-scale and highly profitable engagements offered by multinationals.  One 
consequence was that Bespoke Solutions had to establish expertise in manufacturing 
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processes and needed to be closely networked to a relatively large number of enterprises in 
the core producing regions to survive.  The nature of the engagements also meant Bespoke 
Solutions had to re-sell its services relatively frequently.  To facilitate this, partners had 
strong selling incentives and were encouraged to act ‘entrepreneurially’, that is to pursue 
work opportunistically and without regard for a well-defined corporate strategy.  It was run 
by the founder CEO who held the majority shareholding and built up several close contacts in 
government and business but was also involved in consulting activities.  He established a 
distinctive position among German political and economic elites through his connections and 
the gradual growth in prominence of the firm was closely linked to his own influential 
position.  Often described as Germany’s most prominent management consultant, his firm’s 
reputation flourished around this personal celebrity (Handelblatt, 2012). 
“So, given that [CEO] himself is very present in the media here in Germany, I 
even thought, had the impression that it [Bespoke Solutions] was better known 
than the others” (Human Resources Manager). 
An important turning point in terms of the firm’s fortunes and reputation occurred when the 
firm was awarded several major celebrity consulting projects in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, which were considered of key economic importance to Germany.  The founder’s 
business and political connections were crucial to being able to tender and win these 
contracts.  Some of these related to the re-structuring of state-owned enterprises in the former 
German Democratic Republic after reunification in the 1990s and were particularly well-
publicized, receiving extensive media attention and Bespoke Solutions started to become a 
household name for its role in restructuring the public sector (FAZ, 1990; Financial Times, 
1991).   
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Bespoke Solutions also built on its reputation for restructuring work by emphasizing its 
capabilities to deliver tangible results via close working relationships with its clients.   
 “[Bespoke Solutions] is much more into implementing projects, being a coach 
and a partner for the client and helping the client.” (Client) 
The latter quote reflects a deliberate style of engagement (described by many consultants as 
their ‘down to earth’ approach) that Bespoke Solutions’ partners believed was distinctive. 
They built teams comprising consultants and the client’s own employees to develop and 
implement projects.  The result was that Bespoke Solutions became deeply embedded in the 
client firm and created what Bespoke Solutions’ consultants described as a deep ‘partnership’ 
model of consulting.  This model was meant to differentiate it from competitors and to 
emphasize a capability in strategy implementation.  The partnership model was also 
reinforced through internal branding to employees within the company where the value 
statement language highlighted ‘going the extra mile’ in pursuit of ‘excellence’ for its clients. 
Changing reputation from restructuring to strategy 
In the early 2000s, Bespoke Solutions tried to change its reputation to position itself as 
a strategy consulting firm.  The context for this were changes to the field of 
management consulting triggered by the entry or expansion in Germany of powerful 
elite competitors in the strategic consulting space.  These firms exploited their existing 
reputations and connections among multinational corporate and banking clients to re-
shape the consulting field and cement central positions within it (Faust, 2002).  Parallel 
developments triggered the entry of international law firms disrupting other 
professional fields (Smets et al., 2012).  Bespoke Solutions’ previous legitimacy as a 
central actor in German consulting was therefore threatened: its partners believed that 
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much of its work and capabilities matched these competitors but because it was not 
perceived as a strategy firm, it was denied access to these opportunities.   
-------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------- 
This triggered a phase of reputation change in which the firm tried to transition its 
reputation into ‘pure strategy’, an area that many management consulting firms try to 
occupy for financial and prestige reasons (The Economist, 2013: 80).  Key to this was 
the emphasis that partners placed on its ‘thought leadership’ deriving from and 
embedded within its sector-based organizational structure.  In the view of Bespoke 
Solutions’ consultants, the sector structure facilitated a prolonged development of 
narrow but deep silos of expertise that put it at an advantage relative to its competitors.  
A special team spearheaded its drive to win more competitive and challenging strategy 
projects and to move away from ‘normal’ and ‘easy implementation’ projects.  
Mimicking the strategy consulting firms, it launched an in-house journal in 2004 that 
aimed to emphasise its expertise in strategy plus implementation to distinguish itself 
from its larger, Anglo-American competitors, with which it was increasingly competing 
for work on large projects. 
“We gained a reputation for thought leadership, which wasn’t there before. […] 
Thanks to a lot of work of Marketing especially in publications […] content, 
really influenced our image” (Principal).  
It also introduced a research and training school to promote its internal publications as 
well as provide what it considered innovative teaching across its global network.  This 
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initiative aimed to highlight its thought leadership as well as train its next generation of 
employees to disseminate its knowledge base to existing and potential clients.  In 
addition, it pursued a strategy of becoming better known beyond its specific client base 
for particular strategic issues, such as environmental concerns and governance, that 
were seen to be particularly relevant in a European context, again to emphasise its 
distinctiveness from larger, American competitors.  It also developed and sharpened 
certain feedback mechanisms designed to ensure its engagements were well-received.   
However, it appears that Bespoke Solutions’ existing reputation for restructuring made it 
difficult to change its reputation into strategy consulting.  Partners candidly admitted the 
limited success of this reputational shift among their clients and potential clients, many of 
whom had become more experienced buyers and had a greater awareness of the other market 
offerings as well as an understanding of Bespoke Solutions’ history of restructuring work.  
As a result, clients remained sceptical about Bespoke Solutions’ claims to be in the same 
league as other competitors who were less present in the late 1980s, which challenged the 
firm’s status as the ‘go-to’ strategy consulting firm (see Table 2 and Anand et al., 2007).  
Partners in other offices also acknowledged the persistence of the reputation for restructuring 
in Germany and suggested that this restricted its capacity subsequently to claim to be a 
strategy firm:  
“My view on the Germany market is that [Bespoke Solutions] is [still] very well-known 
for the restructuring business” (Principal, France office). 
Bespoke Solutions tried to change its reputation to position itself as a strategy consulting firm 
by emphasizing in its marketing and its pitches that it was distinctive because it combined 
strategic analysis and ‘execution skills’, thereby blending its existing reputational claims with 
new aspirations.   
Submission ID# 12995 
 
16 
“We have a slogan that’s called, or we used to have it, “Strategies that work”, 
“Creative strategies that work” and I think this is exactly the point I want to state, that 
it’s not only about developing strategies that are the best strategies, but also strategies 
that are the best strategies for this client in this situation” (Senior Consultant). 
The firm pursued the reputation change by tendering for strategy consulting projects.  Each 
project won would provide an opportunity to enhance its expertise in strategy consulting and 
to derive legitimacy with clients from successful projects.  ‘Over-delivery’ was used as a 
reputation device to compensate for the lack of prominence in the strategy consulting domain.  
“Sometimes we over-deliver because people don’t really know us [as a strategy 
specialist] and we’re trying to provide the best” (Principal). 
Key to promoting Bespoke Solutions’ reputation as a strategy consulting firm was the 
public promotion of expertise claims through the ‘thought leadership’ strategy outlined 
above. 
However, Bespoke Solutions’ attempt to shift into the strategy consulting space had only 
qualified success.  While clients said that Bespoke Solutions is widely admired for its 
strategy implementation work, the firm’s track record (defined here as being perceived today 
according to its past activities) meant they did not think it had a reputation as a strategy 
consulting firm.  Competitors thought likewise: 
“[Bespoke Solutions], in my impression, is focusing on restructuring and, for me, 
does not have such a good [strategy] reputation. […].  For me, it’s kind of the stuck in 
the middle company and, in general, has a reputation that they are trying to catch up 
with the [large international strategy consultants] but they don’t really make it.”  
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Indeed, it appears that Bespoke Solutions’ reputation for restructuring, cost-cutting and 
implementation made it more difficult to establish a reputation for strategy consulting. 
Central actors in the consulting field, that is well-connected and sophisticated multinational 
clients with extensive experience of using different types of consulting and powerful 
competitors with established reputations challenged Bespoke Solutions’ assertions to be a 
pure strategy firm.  At the focus group meeting in 2012 a client candidly stated: 
“Sure, you know a lot, as much as anyone, about my industry, but you don’t have a 
distinctive strategy approach.  That’s not where you’re at.  I won’t engage you for that 
sort of work.” 
The firm did not have the relevant strong relationships deeply embedded inside target clients 
to win the sort of business against powerful competitors that would provide a platform for 
making its expertise claims credible.  It recruited several partners from competitor firms to 
bolster its expertise but did not gain access to enough high-profile tenders and projects 
through which it could stake its reputational claims to wider client audiences.  The lack of 
strategy projects inhibited its ability to changes its reputation.  The ability to use the 
founder’s personal celebrity was also more limited when trying to change the firm’s 
reputation.  Indeed, some in the firm felt that the founder’s longstanding celebrity status 
associated with the firm’s restructuring legacy had now become a drag on its ability to re-
position itself as his name was associated closely with previous projects and elites that were 
no longer so dominant in the broader German economic field. 
DISCUSSION 
Theorizing reputation change 
The data from this research sheds light on how firms with established reputations can 
overcome the burden of reputation stickiness through satisfying certain organizational factors 
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and institutional conditions.  We argue that particular organizational factors comprising of 
legitimated expertise, relevant celebrity and strong relationships as well as institutional 
conditions such as the knowledge of clients, competition environment and firm history can 
enable organizations to change their reputations.   
Prior to the firm’s attempt to change its reputation, consulting was largely a relatively 
undifferentiated national field (Scott 1995) although transnational networks and arenas were 
starting to develop in the 1990s (Faust 2002); numerous consulting firms interacted regularly 
in dense networks with clients in short transactions in which the deployment of technical 
expertise was the norm, largely derived from engineering.  ‘Traditionalist’ mittelstand 
management models prevailed in many arenas rather than Anglo-American business models 
(Streeck and Crouch, 1997).  The emergence of the state as an important actor driving 
organizational change via privatization, and a powerful client, reinforced Bespoke Solutions’ 
central position via the close connections of the founder and then the firm more widely.  
Bespoke Solutions emerged as a distinctive actor with strong socio-political legitimacy 
(Suchman 1995) in terms of its novel organizational restructuring expertise, focusing around 
organizational change and strategic implementation, which underpinned the privatization 
project.  This case has important resonance for other contexts in terms of the impact of 
market competition, knowledgeable clients, the political environment and powerful leaders. 
Contestation from other actors in seeking to occupy an international field with substantial 
status and resource barriers can impinge on a firm’s ability to change its reputation 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Lounsbury and Glynn 2001).  Powerful incumbents resist as 
firms seek to move from a relatively peripheral position to a more central one.  Bespoke 
Solutions faced powerful actors, both in the form of ‘pure’ strategy firms protecting their 
existing central positions and other, very large consulting firms with substantial resources 
seeking access to the strategy consulting field by buying specialist strategy firms.  It fell into 
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the trap of changing in an ‘incremental’ rather than a ‘significant’ manner through adopting a 
hybrid approach of strategy implementation which coupled reputation claims of strategy with 
restructuring.  This sent a confused message and raised questions around the legitimacy of its 
reputation claims (Greenwood et al., 2005: 670).  It had neither the connections with relevant 
actors (networked reputation as Glückler and Armbrüster (2003) term it) nor the credibility in 
terms of a track record to make plausible expertise claims through which it could challenge 
the field composition.  Without the reputation to acquire prestigious strategy projects 
Bespoke Solutions was locked into a closed loop which limited its ability to learn and 
therefore build new knowledge competencies (Werr and Stjernberg, 2003).  This is 
theoretically important because a confused message combined with strong competition 
restricts the ability of organizations to change their reputation even when they adapt their 
knowledge base and expertise claims because internal and external stakeholders become 
more sceptical of new reputational claims, particularly in saturated and highly contestable 
markets.  
The firm failed in one of its core geographic markets2 to combine plausible expertise claims 
and high profile relationships via celebrity-based actors and activities.  In effect, Bespoke 
Solutions suffered from reputation stickiness, which was not only a story about its inability to 
transfer from one form of reputation to another (Greenwood et al., 2005), but also about 
being the victim of prior success, namely building a reputation for something which inhibits 
the ability to change reputation into something else.  While Bespoke Solutions sustained 
strong credibility among its clients and competitors in the broad field of restructuring, it 
could not do the same for strategy projects or demonstrate quality in this domain by winning 
the sort of celebrity projects to support its expertise claims.  Nor could the firm’s strategy of 
                                                 
2 We do not stipulate this geographic market to protect the firm’s identity. 
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building goodwill and capturing clients via over-delivery compensate for the fragility of its 
expertise claims.  This has significant implications for the literature on reputation change 
because history and path dependency clearly impinge on the ability of organizations to move 
away from any existing reputation, causing reputational stickiness.  Our results reinforce the 
risk of diversification even in contexts where organizations have successfully built a 
reputation for something because PSFs need to demonstrate to clients that they have 
legitimate expertise in any new area (Greenwood et al., 2005).  Our research also questions 
the empirical reach of Deephouse and Carter’s (2005) argument because we find that 
organizations with strong reputations cannot necessarily shift their reputation in competitive 
markets.  In fact, building a positive reputation can potentially hinder the process of changing 
that reputation.  What is particularly apparent is that reputation change in global 
organizations is not uniform across different regions because although the organizational 
strategy for change may be the same, the overarching organizational factors and institutional 
conditions which enable reputation change are not.  In the context of Bespoke Solutions, for 
example, the firm had multiple and competing reputations in different geographic regions, 
which is a common challenge of global organizations seeking relevance in local markets as 
has been well-documented in HSBC’s slogan as ‘the world’s local bank’ (Koller, 2007). 
We find that the firm could sustain multiple and competing reputations for different qualities 
across different geographic markets.  The varying success of Bespoke Solutions in different 
geographic locations to change its reputation, which was a global initiative, provides 
important evidence for how organizations can effectively change their reputations.  We argue 
that specific organizational factors, namely legitimated expertise, relevant celebrity and 
strong relationships, and institutional conditions, namely the knowledge of clients, 
competition environment and firm history can enable organizations to change their 
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reputations.  This is theoretically important because we provide valuable insight into how 
organizations can overcome reputation stickiness and change their reputations. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has sought to understand how organizations effectively change their reputations.  
We illustrate the underlying organizational factors and institutional conditions that enable 
organizations to change their reputations.  Consistent with the literature on the ‘burden of 
celebrity’ (Fombrun, 1996; Wade et al., 2006) we find that the role of a celebrity can be 
perceived both positively when individual reputation aligns with the firm’s reputation, and 
negatively when individual reputation misaligns with the firm’s reputation for changing the 
reputation of a firm.  However, a celebrity status per se is not enough to change reputation 
and can act as an unwanted distraction that stakeholders focus on at the expense of the firm’s 
intended reputation.  Further work is needed on the role and limits of CEOs and founders as 
well as other key rainmakers such as celebrity partners for changing a firm’s reputation. 
We also argue that institutional conditions impact upon the viability of reputational formation 
and shifts.  Reputation building of the firm occurred at a particular historical context.  
However, institutional conditions impacted upon the firm’s ability to change its reputation.  
Armbrüster (2006) has argued that network reputation, a form of reputation that sits between 
personal experience and generalized knowledge is central to competitive advantage for 
consulting firms.  An important implication from this case is that an existing reputation 
(positive or negative) can inhibit reputation change because of stickiness when clients form 
judgments based on a firm’s prior reputation as opposed to what organizations perceive as 
their existing reputation (what Brown et al. (2006) refer to as construed image).  Our research 
extends beyond the contributions of Greenwood et al. (2005) on accountancy firms because 
even though stickiness exists, there is a clear internal pressure for management consulting 
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firms and their partners to diversify, particularly in prestigious areas such as strategy, despite 
clear resistance externally to accept such change as legitimate.  Reputation change is fraught 
with risk because clients and employees question any new reputation claims which are not 
adequately legitimized.  This is even more problematic when a global firm has built a strong 
reputation in a particular domain because different stakeholders in multiple geographic 
regions struggle to make sense of the dissonance between its prior and its claimed reputation. 
Current theorizing in reputation generally offers little insight into organizational factors and 
institutional conditions which facilitate or inhibit processes of reputation change.  Further 
research could productively consider the overlapping role and impact of organizations, 
multiple stakeholders and their institutional contexts for changing reputation in a variety of 
contexts.  For instance, the context of institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) 
wherein organizations must draw from multiple institutional logics (Jay, 2013: 137) via 
hybrid structures and practices (Pache and Santos, 2013) as well as many clients becoming 
increasingly knowledgeable buyers of consulting services, raises important questions around 
how PSFs change their reputations as well as how employees, clients and other salient 
stakeholders perceive these initiatives.   
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Table 1: Coding Scheme 
First-Order Codes Second-Order Codes Third-Order Codes 
     1980s – early 2000s 
Reputation for: 
Restructuring 
Large scale change 
Pragmatism 
Down-to-earth 








     Early 2000s – 2013 








Lack relevant experience 
Few high profile tenders 




Substance of expertise 
Style of engagement 
Prestigious work 












Building new relationships 
Reputation stickiness 




Limited ability to change reputation 
Celebrity less relevant 








  Legitimated expertise 
  Relevant celebrity  
  Strong relationships 
 
Institutional conditions 
  Field of consulting 
  Market for clients 
and competitors 






  Legitimated 
expertise 
  Relevant celebrity 
  Strong relationships 
 
Institutional conditions 
  Field of international 
consulting 
  Market for clients 
and competitors 
  History and path                 
dependency 
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They still have the reputation of being rather focused on the actual 
results in the end, and to my perspective, this can also be seen in the 
people working for the firm, that means they rather look for 
personalities which can pursue their goals in tough situations 
(Competitor). 
“We have a good reputation concerning our consultants – down-to-
earth, friendly guys, not arrogant.  We have certainly a less strategic 
footprint than many – or some of our competitors, which is not bad 
– you have to differentiate yourself, can’t be all running into the 
same direction” (Principal). 
 Celebrity 
founder 
The quality of the brand so far is behind the name, the brand name 
[Mr Smith], there is a person and you can touch this person, and 
this is, I think, even on an international level, it’s very important 
that the owner is still in touch with the company, even if he is not 
the CEO anymore, and that he stands for high quality and he has a 
good reputation in the media and so on (Partner). 
 So, given that [Bespoke Solutions’ founder] himself is very present 
in the media here in Germany, I even had the impression that 
[Bespoke Solutions] was…better known than [other international 
strategy consultants] (Manager). 
 Strong client 
relationships 
I’m positively fond of my former organisation, so whenever I see a 
chance for them to gain contact or access to an organisation and 
maybe win a project, I’m happy to give that contact, and I’ve done 
so in the recent years, and I think it’s a very important factor 
(Alumnus). 
What I liked so much about the [Bespoke Solutions] approach was 
that it carried from [contract] to implementation, and we really 
stayed in the [client] company to make sure that the things [that we 
contracted] happened there (Alumnus – now with competitor firm). 
[CEO] himself has been quite adept at actually establishing a 
network of contacts with politicians in Germany.  He and his 
company are advising various branches of the federal state – for 
example the Federal Labour Office – and that’s publicly known, 
and also a very strong network of contacts in German industry 
(Competitor). 
We have a special client satisfaction tool – it’s called [advantage 
client] – and when we see it over the time, we gain much more 
reputation in the quality of our work. [...] From my point of view, 
much more important is the personal impression you leave with the 
client: on one side, your personal network, or on the other side, 
during a pitch, how you present you and your team to the client 
(Partner). 
  












We do not see them at all during pitches and they’re not invited into 
pitches there, because they do not have the size and the reputation. 
(Competitor) 
For [Bespoke Solutions] of course I know this company very well.  
[…] The strength is that the company is very much results-driven, 
goal-oriented, and also I think they have a very good combination 
of some, you know, strategic thinking with their detail and also 
hands-on customer situation. […] But the weakness would probably 
be I think that, in terms of the strategic level, and also professional 
level, I think that [Bespoke Solutions] is still lower than, you know, 
some other international brands (Client). 
So now there are certain issues the company will really focus on, 
which are pushed, from the CEO down, which is also a good point 
– you have to kind of have a footprint in certain issues.  We were 
for instance the first to publish large scale studies on green 
whatever in Germany, which brought us a lot of projects and a lot 
of press coverage, so people are turning to us, the press is turning to 
us for interviews and so on so reputation really got better 
(Principal). 
Some new marketing tools like our [anonymised] magazine which 
is sent out to the CEOs of the most important companies here in 
Germany and also, on the international level, in some other 
languages – in English, Russian, Chinese, and so on. This is part of 
the improvement of our reputation, especially regarding our 
[thought] leadership (Partner).  
 Lack relevant 
client 
relationships 
I think [Bespoke Solutions’] reputation is for hands-on issues, 
which can be interpreted both positive and negative, yeah.  I think 
there are CEOs who say, okay, on this topic, I need, let’s say, a real 
strategy consultant, so they will go with [two large international 




So I’d say that with some companies, we have difficulties being 
listed as a consultancy company because we are strategy 
consultancy, but some people believe that there is only two or three 
strategy consultancy companies in the world, which are  [large 
international strategy consultants]. We did some projects [for these 
companies] which are not only strategy, so we are not getting listed 
to the strategy company.  So this is a big issue. So we suffer from 
our reputation, definitely” (Principal). 
Well, we’re definitely not the ones renowned for strategic work, at 
least the image is such, so that’s definitely a point for improvement 
(Partner). 
 
